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FOREWARNED WAR: THE TARGETING OF CIVILIAN AIRCRAFTS
IN SOUTH AMERICA AND THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS
SYSTEM

Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg*
Throughout the War on Drugs, South American governments have fought a difficult and many times losing battle
against drug trafficking. Lack of resources and policing capabilities have lead a growing number of States to adopt so
called “Shoot-Down Laws”, legislation designed to authorize use of lethal force against “hostile” aircraft suspected of
being involved in narco-trafficking. This article examines
said laws from the viewpoint of international law, humanitarian law and human rights law. The article makes the point
that mere transportation of narcotics cannot be reason
enough to authorize use of lethal force and that “ShootDown Laws” constitute both a violation of the right to life
and a misuse of the law of armed conflict to justify military
action against civilian aircraft. The article claims that other
alternatives, such as closer bilateral cooperation and enforcement, must be explored if these governments want to
avoid being sued for human rights violations at the InterAmerican level.
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4. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF “SHOOT-DOWN” LAWS .......18
5. A FOREWARNED WAR ..............................................................23
People in South America have a saying: ‘Guerra avisada no
mata gente,’ which roughly translates to ‘a forewarned war never
kills anyone.’ It is a call for preparedness for an upcoming and unavoidable evil. He who takes early precautions for a known misfortune will no longer suffer its consequences in the future. It is the
South American equivalent to the old adage that ‘knowing is half
the battle,’ or as Latin Americans would have it, the entire war. This
paper will analyze one such example of a forewarned calamity. One
not related to war though, but to the misuse of the law of war, or
international humanitarian law -as it is also called- by South American governments in the fight against narco-traffic.
Countries in South America face a steep challenge to curb the
spread of drug production within their borders. Inaccessible jungles
and lack of resources prevent law enforcement agencies from carrying out normal policing actions in drug producing regions. In such
areas, organized criminal groups operate with fair amounts of impunity, sometimes even guarded by insurgent groups or mercenary
forces. Because of this, cocaine production in the region has remained stable, despite international efforts and considerable funds
invested to stop it.
In order to counter this trend, since the early nineties, up to five
different South American states have legislated with regards to what
they call “leyes de derribo”, which literally translates to “ShootDown” laws. These laws, in essence, authorize the use of deadly
force against civilian aircraft suspected of being involved in narcotrafficking. Its defenders claim that such a measure is the only thing
that can guarantee the rule of law in South American jungles.
In this article, I will argue against these laws both from a legal
and a policy perspective. From a legal point of view, I maintain that
use of lethal force against civilian –albeit criminal– aircraft constitutes both a violation of the international law of civilian aviation as
well as human rights law. Specifically, I take issue with the blatant
manipulation of law of war concepts of “hostilities” and “hostile
acts” employed by these laws. From a policy perspective, I will argue that any perceived advantage that the downing of suspicious aircraft might create, would be offset by the unintended consequence
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of empowering domestic armed groups, which will be now in charge
of protecting drug caravans through the jungle to the detriment of
local civilian populations.
If fully applied, it is only a matter of time before these laws reach
international fora, where they will be rapidly, and swiftly, declared
contrary to international law. This is, with all certainty, a forewarned
war, and one that South American governments are destined to lose.
Instead of stubbornly pursuing a legally unsound course of action,
South American governments should increase multilateral cooperation and establish multilateral agreements that allow them to tackle
the problem of narco-trafficking within the framework of human
rights law. Not doing so will simply mean legal defeat at the hands
of human rights law, which in turn would spike the growing antihuman rights rhetoric already prevalent in the South-American subcontinent. These problems are entirely predictable and avoidable.
“Guerra avisada no mata gente.”
1.
THE SOUTH AMERICAN DRUG MARKET
Before I can explain the legal issues affecting “Shoot-Down”
laws, it is important to first understand the underlying problem of
the drugs that birthed them. The drug problem in South America is
that of cocaine. Currently, the 132,300 hectares of cocaine bush cultivation areas in the world are distributed between just three countries: Colombia (52%), Peru (32%) and Bolivia (15%).1 These three
countries produce an estimated 943 tons of cocaine every year, with
authorities being able to intercept between 43 and 68% each year
(i.e. between 405 and 641 tons per year).2 It is estimated that the
U.S. –the largest cocaine consumption market in the world- needs
only 196 tons to satisfy its demand.3 Thus, even assuming authori-

1

World Drug Report 2016, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 35-36 (May
2016), http://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_
web.pdf.
2
Id. at 36.
3
Keegan Hamilton, The Golden Age of Drug Trafficking: How Meth, Cocaine, and Heroin Move Around the World, VICE NEWS (Apr. 25, 2016), https://n
ews.vice.com/article/drug-trafficking-meth-cocaine-heroin-global-drug-smuggli
ng.
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ties manage to intercept its maximum load of 641 tons, narco-traffickers would still possess 302 tons; more than enough to satisfy
their American consumers. The South American cocaine flow therefore consists of making sure that at least 196 tons out of those 943
produced get safely to the U.S. and send any surplus to Europe and
Brazil.
“Shoot-Down” laws were created as a law enforcement tool for
South American nations to disrupt this drug trail through the destruction of airplanes carrying processed cocaine to other points of
embarkation. It is important to note, however, that while in the early
days of the drug business, cocaine smuggling in direct flights from
the Andes to the United States was possible, increased demand and
more stringent airport and airline controls have rendered this option
impractical, if not virtually impossible. “Shoot-Down” laws are thus
not meant to address any form of large cargo planes, but rather small
bi-rotor airplanes that engage in short flights from one country to
another in specific portions of an otherwise longer trip.
Drug transportation is a complex and time consuming endeavor,
requiring the moving of large quantities of merchandise through
several different countries. This task, therefore, is much better suited
for maritime transportation, where larger quantities can be moved
than by air. In fact, according to a 2010 United Nations report, cocaine is typically transported from Colombia to Mexico or Central
America by sea and then onwards by land to the United States and
Canada, with 90% of cocaine leaving from Colombia via either the
Pacific or the Atlantic sea-routes; and 10% via Venezuela, through
the use of aircraft.4 It would thus be an over-simplification and a
mistake to state that shooting down planes is an essential component
to fighting the spread of drugs in the world. Rather, airplanes play a
very specific role in very specific stages of the cocaine flow. In order
to understand which, one has to properly understand the cocaine
trail.
4

The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 87-88 (June 2010), https://www.u
nodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pd
f; see also Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 32 (Sept. 2012),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_
America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf.
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Cocaine usually starts its life as a coca leaf on a plantation, typically in the Peruvian VRAEM region,5 but also in southwestern Colombia or central Bolivia. Peruvian coca leaves and coca paste must
then be shipped to cocaine production areas in Bolivia and Colombia. Once in Colombia, cocaine is transported by sea in semi-submersible vessels or so-called “go-fast” boats hopping through the
coast of Panama until they get to Costa Rica and Nicaragua.6 In these
countries, cocaine is moved onwards in a wide set of air, land, and
sea transports to Honduras, where it meets with air-transported cocaine coming directly from Venezuela and ultimately imported to
Guatemala, where flows are bottlenecked for later land transportation into Mexico and the United States.7
On this route, aircraft are mostly relevant in two points of the
trip: (i) transportation of coca paste to Bolivia and Colombia and (ii)
transportation of cocaine from Venezuela to Honduras. In both of
these cases, however, the choice of air transportation does not seem
to respond to any specific need other than expediency. If denied access to air transport, traffickers would likely be able to devise alternative transportation mechanisms.
Take for example the situation in Venezuela, which is becoming
a larger hub for cocaine shipments to Central America over the years
not because it is a more convenient route, but mainly because of
porous law enforcement. According to a 2016 Department of State
Report, “public corruption is a major problem in Venezuela that
makes it easier for drug-trafficking organizations to move and
smuggle illegal drugs.”8 In fact, according to the Department of
State, “[c]redible reporting indicates that individual members of the

5

VRAEM is a Spanish acronym for “Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y
Mantaro.” Jose Luis Pardo & Alejandra S. Inzunza, Peru’s VRAEM Region: The
Home of Miss Coca, INSIGHT CRIME (June 17, 2014), http://www.insightcrime.o
rg/news-analysis/perus-vraem-region-the-home-of-miss-coca.
6
Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A
Threat Assessment, supra note 4, at 32-40.
7
Id.
8
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug & Chemical Control, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT
AFFAIRS 296 (Mar. 2016), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253655
.pdf.
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government and security forces [are] engaged in or facilitated drug
trafficking activities.”9
In the case of Peruvian traffic to Bolivia and Colombia, if denied
air transportation capabilities, Peruvian narco-traffickers would engage in land transportation. This, in fact, has already happened. According to the Department of State, since early 2015, just a few
months before the approval of Peru’s “Shoot-Down” law10 aerial activities in coca producing regions declined due to increased military
and police activity, aggressive destruction of clandestine airstrips
and the installation of radar facilities.11 In response, trafficking organizations simply began moving cocaine base overland to clandestine airfields further east, closer to Bolivia.12
2.

THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Civilian Aircraft are specifically protected by customary law and
applicable treaties, such as the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation.13 These norms reflect an international legal
order profoundly concerned with the safety of civilian air traffic.
While international law does give States the option of requiring an
unauthorized aircraft to land at an airport of choosing, it does not
authorize use of force, except in instances of self-defense.14 Thus,
under Article 3bis of the Chicago Convention, States must “refrain
from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight
[and], in case of interception, the lives of persons on board and the
safety of aircraft must not be endangered.”15

9

Id. at 16.
Ley No. 30339, Aug. 29, 2015, Diario Oficial El Peruano [D.O.] (Peru).
11
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug & Chemical Control, supra note 8, at 250.
12
Id.
13
See generally Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 15
U.N.T.S. 295.
14
Protocol to the Convention on International Civil Rights, art. 3bis, May 10,
1984, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (“[t]his provision shall not be interpreted as modifying in
any way the rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations.”).
15
Id.
10
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Article 3bis was negotiated in the wake of the downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007 in 1983, when a Soviet fighter mistook it
for a spy-plane.16 Member States to the Chicago Convention met in
April 1984, in Montreal, to negotiate a new clause for the Convention to specifically address the protections afforded to civilian aircraft.17
At the negotiating table, most parties were in agreement that
their task was merely to codify an already existing customary legal
regime. In his Opening Statement during the First Plenary Meeting,
the Acting President of the Assembly confidently affirmed that
“[t]here is no doubt that these humanitarian principles concerning
the protection of human life are deeply rooted in customary international law.”18 His main motivation for the meeting was his belief
that “[a] written rule of law is far superior to general principles recognized as customary law because frequently the very existence of
a customary law or its exact scope and content may remain subject
to challenge.”19 These thoughts were echoed by other delegations
present in Montreal. The Chief Delegate of the United Kingdom
added that “the development of international law, particularly during this century, has made it clear beyond doubt that in time of
peace, the use of force against civil aircraft is subject to very severe
limitations.”20 Discussions at the Montreal meeting mostly revolved
around the actual necessity to amend the Chicago Convention, not
the existence of a rule of international law banning use of force
against civilian aircraft.21
For the negotiating States at the Montreal meeting, self-defense
was the only acceptable reason for using force against a civilian aircraft.22 This authorization, however, was to be construed narrowly.
The delegation of Belgium, for example, stated that the notion of
16

Thom Patterson, The Downing of Flight 007: 30 Years Later, a Cold War
Tragedy Still Seems Surreal, CNN (Aug. 31, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/
08/31/us/kal-fight-007-anniversary/.
17
See generally Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Assembly 25th Session Plenary Meetings, ICAO Doc. 9437-A25-Res., P-min. (Apr. 24 - May 10, 1984) [
hereinafter ICAO 25th Session].
18
Id. at 20.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 27.
21
Id. at 26-27.
22
ICAO 25th Session, supra note 17, at 29.
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self-defense should be limited to extreme cases and that it had to be
exercised in good faith and be commensurate with the attack.23 The
United Kingdom also clarified that “you cannot kill a trespasser unless he poses an imminent threat to your life.”24 It even stressed that:
If the aircraft merely enters the State’s airspace without permission, whether by mistake or deliberately,
there can be no justification for using force against
it, even if it is being used for activities inconsistent
with its status as a civil aircraft. Provided it is not
endangering the lives of persons not on board, the use
of force against it cannot be regarded as permissible.25
The legal regime recognized at Montreal is thus fairly straightforward: A State may not use force against a civilian aircraft save in
cases of self-defense, whether within the meaning of Article 51 of
the UN Charter, or as a means of protecting individuals not on board
the intercepted plane. These two instances relate to the right to selfdefense both in terms of the jus ad bellum and human rights law. I
will analyze both concepts below.
a)

Self-Defense and the Jus Ad Bellum
At the time of the Montreal conference, the delegation of New
Zealand was one of the few Western States to take a critical view of
mentioning self-defense as an authorization for the use of force
against civilian aircraft. For New Zealand, “it was impossible . . .
that civil aviation could ever give rise to circumstances in which
self-defence could be justified.”26 In its view, an aircraft engaged in
civil aviation was unable to carry out or participate in an armed attack, and thus could not be able to trigger Article 51 of the UN Charter.27
Such a determination seemed accurate. Ten years prior to the
Montreal meeting, the UN General Assembly had defined “aggression” as “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
23
24
25
26
27

Id. at 71.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 106.
ICAO 25th Session, supra note 17, at 107.
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territorial integrity or political independence of another State.”28
This definition was quickly understood to inform the requirements
for self-defense against an armed attack under Article 51 of the UN
Charter,29 something that the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
would ultimately confirm in its decision in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua case a mere seven
months after the Montreal meeting.30 Such a definition of self-defense clearly restricted it to armed attacks carried out by States, not
private actors or civilian aircraft. Nowadays, however, in this post9/11 world, the situation has become somewhat less straightforward.
Immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United Nations
Security Council passed Resolution No. 1368.31 The resolution’s
third perambulatory clause specifically recognized the application
of the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.”32 This was the first time that such a right
had been invoked for an armed attack launched by a non-state actor,
such as al-Qaeda. Such a recognition was the starting point for what
has become a vigorous and challenging debate within the international legal community as to whether self-defense against a nonstate actor can be invoked as a justification for the use of force in
the territory of another State.
Up until this point, all prior precedents such as Israel’s actions
against the Palestine Liberation Organization in Tunisia in 1985, had
been met with strong condemnation by the international community.33 Under the prevailing view of the time, as explained by the
ICJ in its Nicaragua decision, a non-state actor could only engage in
an armed attack if such an attack could be attributed to another
state.34 For attribution to exist, the state had to exercise effective

28

G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at 143 (Dec. 14, 1974).
David Luban, Just War and Human Rights, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160, 16162 (1980).
30
See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nica. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1984, I.C.J. Rep. 70. (Nov. 26) (Jurisdiction of the
Court and Admissibility of the Application).
31
S.C. Res. 1368, (Sept. 12, 2001).
32
Id.
33
S.C. Res. 573, (Oct. 4, 1985).
34
Nica. v. U.S., supra note 30, at ¶ 195.
29
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control over the military or paramilitary operations to a degree that
exceeds mere logistical support.35
Since 9/11, and in some cases even since as far back as the late
nineties, this position has been increasingly challenged both in literature and by state practice.36 Cases of States attacking non-state actors in the territory of another state now include the United States’
ongoing airstrikes against al-Qaeda in Pakistan and ISIS in Syria,
Israel’s 2006 attack against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Russia’s 2007
attack against Chechen rebels in Georgia, Turkey’s 2007 attack
against the PKK in Northern Iraq, and Colombia’s 2008 attack
against FARC terrorists in Ecuador.37 Some sectors of the international legal community also seem to be leaning towards a new understanding of armed attack that accepts the use of force in response
to an attack by a non-state armed force in such instances where the
host state is either unwilling or unable to address the threat.38
The so-called “unwilling or unable standard” however has received strong criticism in scholarship39 and has thus far been unable
to consolidate as a serious legal theory in today’s jus ad bellum.40 If
anything, the ICJ has continued to apply its restrictive approach to
the use of force in its subsequent case law. For instance, in its 2005
decision for the Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo case,
the ICJ rejected Uganda’s claim that its attack on the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) armed group within the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) was an example of self-defense. The Court said:

35

See id. at ¶¶ 109-15 (detailing account of pre-9/11 jus ad bellum); see generally Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT’L.
L. 359 (2009).
36
Tams, supra note 35, at 380.
37
Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare and the Right to SelfDefense Post-9/11, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 244, 246 (2011).
38
Ashley Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Towards a Normative Framework
for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L. L. 483, 503 (2012).
39
Kevin Jon Heller, Ashley Deeks’ Problematic Defense of the “Unwilling
or Unable” Test, OPINIO JURIS (Dec. 15, 2011), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/15/
ashley-deeks-failure-to-defend-the-unwilling-or-unable-test/ (arguing that proponents of the unwilling or unable standard have been unable to offer a careful analysis of state practice and opinion juris).
40
Tams, supra note 35, at 382 (arguing that “states and courts have been clear
[in that] they have treated the new practice under the rubric of self-defence, and
have not ‘invented’ new exceptions to the use of force.”).
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[W]hile Uganda claimed to have acted in self-defense, it did not ever claim that it had been subjected
to an armed attack by the armed forces of the DRC.
The ‘armed attacks’ to which reference was made
came rather from the ADF. The Court has found
above ( . . . ) that there is no satisfactory proof of the
involvement in these attacks, direct or indirect, of the
Government of the DRC. The attacks did not emanate from armed bands or irregulars sent by the DRC
or on behalf of the DRC ( . . . ). The Court is of the
view that, on the evidence before it, even if this series
of deplorable attacks could be regarded as cumulative in character, they still remained non-attributable
to the DRC. For all these reasons, the Court finds that
the legal and factual circumstances for the exercise
of a right of self-defence by Uganda against the DRC
were not present.41
This is a clear restatement of the “effective control” standard set
out in the Nicaragua case two decades before.42 The ADF, on its
own, was unable to commit an armed attack that could trigger
Uganda’s right to self-defense under the UN Charter.
This decision was not absent of controversy. ICJ Judge Bruno
Simma even appended an individual opinion in which he criticized
the Court’s “restrictive reading of Article 51.”43 For Judge Simma,
“in the light of more recent developments not only in State practice
but also with regard to accompanying opinion juris, [the international law on self-defence] ought urgently be reconsidered.”44 Judge
Kooijmans agreed with him, stating that whenever a government
lacks almost all authority in a specific part of its territory, and
“armed attacks are carried out by irregular bands from such territory
against a neighbouring State, [then] they are still armed attacks even
41

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶¶ 146-47 (Dec. 19).
42
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra
note 30, at ¶ 99.
43
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, supra note 42, at ¶ 11
(separate opinion by Simma, J.).
44
Id.
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if they cannot be attributed to the territorial State.”45 He thus concluded that “[i]t would be unreasonable to deny the attacked State
the right to self-defence merely because there is no attacker State,
and the Charter does not so require.”46
For the time being, however, the ICJ remains unconvinced by
such arguments. And given its highly authoritative position within
international law, the best one can say is that while the law is currently “in a state of flux”47 it still has not accepted any deviation
from the traditional understanding of self-defense. This means,
therefore, that Article 51 will continue to be restricted to armed activities between states, even despite the growing trend of contrary
scholarship.48
If applied to the case of “Shoot-Down” laws, it is evident that
mere possession of narcotics by a transnational criminal organization (or the commission of any other such common crime, for that
matter) would fall immensely below the threshold required to activate the right to self-defense under international law. Indeed, if the
ICJ is still unable to accept that an organized armed group in control
of part of the territory of another state waging war against the defending state is still not sufficiently organized to commit an armed
attack, then a transnational criminal gang operating from within the
intercepting state and dedicated to the mere manufacture and
transport of narcotics would be even less able to commit one. In
simple terms, therefore, it would be impossible for a State to argue
that it is authorized by the international law of self-defense to target
and destroy a civilian aircraft transporting narcotics. New Zealand
still prevails.
b)

Self-Defense and Human Rights
Another case in which “Shoot-Down” laws may be legal is in
cases where law enforcement officers need to use lethal force in order to protect themselves or other citizens. In this version of selfdefense, jus ad bellum plays no part at all, and rather, human rights

45

Id. at ¶ 30 (separate opinion by Kooijmans, J.).
Id.
47
Tams, supra note 35, at 382.
48
See e.g. Monica Hakimi, Defensive Force Against Non-State Actors: The
State of Play, 91 Int’l. L. Stud. 1, 6 (2015).
46
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law does. Under human rights law, States have an obligation to respect the right to life of its citizens. The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights affirms that “[e]very human being has the
inherent right to life . . . No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life.”49 In the context of South America, the same is true for the
American Convention on Human Rights. Article 4 states in similar
terms that “[e]very person has the right to have his life respected . . .
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”50
Human rights tribunals have interpreted the concept of “arbitrary
deprivation of life” to great detail, determining that use of lethal
force in times of peace is only legal if undertaken as a last resort.
Indeed, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated that
“[t]he use of force by law enforcement officials must be defined by
exceptionality and must be planned and proportionally limited by
the authorities.”51 This means that lethal force must only be used “to
the minimum extent possible in all circumstances and never exceed
the use which is absolutely necessary in relation to the force or threat
to be repealed”52 and that “force or coercive means can only be used
once all other methods of control have been exhausted and have
failed.”53
The threshold of “absolute necessity” is shared by all major human rights institutions and is a very stringent limitation on law enforcement activity. For example, the UN Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions’ 2014 Report strictly stated
that the principle that life must be protected “demands that lethal
force may not be used intentionally merely to protect law and order
or to serve other similar interests”, adding that “it may not be used
only to disperse protests, to arrest a suspected criminal, or to safeguard other interests such as property . . . A fleeing thief who poses

49

United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
50
United Nations American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
51
Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 166, ¶ 83 (July 4, 2007).
52
Id. at ¶ 84 (internal quotations omitted).
53
Id. at ¶ 83.
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no immediate danger may not be killed, even if it means that the
thief will escape.”54
This standard has been codified by the UN in what is known as
the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, often referred to as the Basic Principles in
short.55 Principle 9 restates the use of force standard as follows:
Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms
against persons except in self-defence or defence of
others against the imminent threat of death or serious
injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly
serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest
a person presenting such a danger and resisting their
authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only
when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve
these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use
of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.56
Under such rules, the transportation of narcotics falls flatly outside of any valid justification for the use of lethal force by law enforcement officials in self-defense. Mere commission of a non-violent crime cannot be disproportionately handled by law enforcement
through lethal violent means without violating proportionality. Law
enforcement officials intercepting narco-traffickers would require
further action from the aircraft in question that puts their own life or
the life of others in danger before actually opening fire.

54
Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 72, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/36, (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session26/Docume
nts/A-HRC-26-36_en.doc [hereinafter Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial].
55
See U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials (Aug. 27 - Sept. 7, 1990), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest
/Pages/UseOfForceAndFirearms.aspx.
56
Id. at ¶ 9.
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3.
MISUSE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
As I have shown above, use of lethal force against an aircraft
suspected of transporting narcotic drugs is generally illegal under
both jus ad bellum and human rights law. Law enforcement officials
simply cannot engage civilian (albeit criminal) aircraft in such a
way. It is because of this, however, that all “Shoot-Down” laws in
South America include a provision that seeks to quite purposefully
de-civilianize these criminal aircraft by means of declaring them
“hostile.” Once hostility has been determined, these laws seek to
pluck the aircraft from the reach of the Chicago Convention and insert it within the scope of international humanitarian law (“IHL”)—
the body of laws that regulates the conduct of belligerents in an
armed conflict.
Under IHL, the legal regime applicable to the use of lethal force
changes entirely, from one of absolute necessity, last resort, and
self-defense to one of “status based targeting,” as it is called.57 Reduced to its simplest explanation, under status based targeting, parties to an armed conflict are allowed to use lethal force against their
enemy based solely on its identity as a participant in the conflict.58
If the parties are two states—if the conflict is of an international
character—then their soldiers are authorized by international law to
open fire against anyone who qualifies as a combatant under the
terms of the Third Geneva Convention.59 If the parties are a state
and a non-state organized armed group—a non-international armed
conflict—then government forces can use lethal force against anyone directly participating in hostilities.60 In both cases, however, use
of lethal force directly against innocent, or even indirectly participating civilians, is strictly forbidden.61
57

GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 187 (Cambridge University Press, 1st ed. 2010).
58
Id. at 188 (arguing that “[c]ombatants may be attacked at any time until
they surrender or are otherwise hors de combat, and not only when actually threatening the enemy.”).
59
Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
(III)]
60
SOLIS, supra note 57, at 188.
61
Id.; see generally Geneva Convention (III), supra note 59 (civilians can,
however, be the subject of non-intentional attack, as part of collateral damage for
a proportional attack against a combatant).
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The concept of direct participation in hostilities (“DPH”) is complicated to grasp. Under IHL, DPH “refers to specific hostile acts
carried out by individuals as part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed conflict.”62 In order to qualify as DPH,
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—an authoritative entity in the field of IHL—states that a specific act must:
1. be likely to adversely affect the military operations
or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict
or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm), and
2. there must be a direct causal link between the act
and the harm likely to result either from that act, or
from a coordinated military operation of which that
act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and
3. the act must be specifically designed to directly
cause the required threshold of harm in support of a
party to the conflict and to the detriment of another
(belligerent nexus).63
Thus, for example, a farmer sympathetic to a rebel force who,
upon seeing government forces, grabs a pistol and decides to open
fire against them, immediately becomes a direct participant in hostilities even if he never actually joined the rebel force in the first
place. Indeed, he is inflicting death upon the specific soldiers, and,
therefore, meets the threshold of harm: there is a direct causal link
between his squeezing the trigger and the harm he is causing on the
soldiers, and, he is acting specifically to benefit one side of the conflict and injure another, thus meeting the belligerent nexus requirement.

62

Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation
in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE
RED CROSS 45 (2009), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icr
c-002-0990.pdf.
63
Id. at 46.
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The requirement of a belligerent nexus, however, is important.
As stated by the ICRC, many activities during armed conflict cause
harm and yet are not considered DPH.
For example, the exchange of fire between police and
hostage-takers during an ordinary bank robbery, violent crimes committed for reasons unrelated to the
conflict, and the stealing of military equipment for
private use, may cause the required threshold of
harm, but are not specifically designed to support a
party to the conflict by harming another.64
Under such a framework, therefore, a narco-trafficking organization committing common crimes in the course of an armed conflict would not generally be engaging in DPH, unless it specifically
decided to engage in violence in support of the rebel group opposing
the government. Moreover, management of a drug smuggling business as a means of financing an insurgent group would not count as
direct participation either. As stated by the ICRC, “the financing or
production of weapons and the provision of food to the armed forces
may be indispensable, but not directly causal, to the subsequent infliction of harm.”65
This idea of a belligerent nexus, however, brings forth an important reality of all “Shoot-Down” laws: of the five South American nations that have regulated them, only one—Colombia—is currently engaged in an armed conflict of any sort. Brazil, Bolivia, Peru,
and Venezuela are simply managing domestic crime, not an armed
conflict.66 This means, therefore, that save for the case of Colombia,
talking of hostile aircraft in these countries is simply an absurd legal
impossibility because there are no hostilities in which to participate
directly in. Indeed, as stated by the ICRC:
The notion of direct participation in hostilities essentially comprises two elements, namely that of ‘hostilities’ and that of ‘direct participation’ therein.
64

Id. at 60-61 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 54.
66
See generally Colombia: Recognition of Armed Conflict a Positive Step,
ICTJ (May 12, 2011) https://www.ictj.org/news/colombia-recognition-armed-con
flict-positive-step.
65
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While the concept of ‘hostilities’ refers to the (collective) resort by the parties to the conflict to means
and methods of injuring the enemy, ‘participation’ in
hostilities refers to the (individual) involvement of a
person in these hostilities.67
Simply put, without a collective engaging in hostilities against
the government, one single individual or criminal enterprise cannot
be accused of being hostile. They are not attacking the government
with intent to defeat an enemy, but rather breaching its legislation
with intent to generate wealth. In essence, a declaration of hostility
in time of peace is impossible. Use of lethal force under a status
targeting standard, or any other manner outside the absolute necessity criteria of human rights law, would simply amount to an extrajudicial execution. In other words, in times of peace, violent acts are
not hostile acts subject to lethal targeting, but criminal acts, subject
to arrest and prosecution.
4.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF “SHOOT-DOWN” LAWS
Supporters of “Shoot-Down Laws” argue that they are mostly a
dissuading tool that would seldom be used in practice. This was, for
example, a significant component of the campaign in favor of approving Peru’s law.68 The argument, as it goes, states that criminal
organizations would be less prone to use aircrafts for their illegal
activities if they knew they can be shot down for doing so, thus reducing crime altogether.
As I mentioned above, however, air transportation is not an essential component of cocaine flows in South America. If forced to
choose alternative means of transportation, narco-traffickers would
be entirely able to do so. And as with any economic choice, this
decision will have both seen and unseen effects. Indeed, legal rules
exist in order to change how the people affected by them act.69 The
67

Id. at 43 (footnotes omitted).
Humala: ‘Ley Para Derribar Narcoavionetas en Perú es una Medida Disuasiva’, PERÚ21 (Aug. 22, 2015), http://peru21.pe/politica/humala-ley-derribarnarcoavionetas-peru-medida-disuasiva-2225851.
69
DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH
LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 3-4 (Princeton University Press 2000).
68
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problem, however, is that legal rules do not always manage to create
the result they intended, but instead create one entirely different that
its drafters simply never foresaw. That is, for example, to some degree, the case regarding minimum-wage laws. Legislators want to
increase the wellbeing of workers. In practice however, there comes
a point where any additional increase to the minimum wage would
hurt, rather than help, workers, as it incentivizes businesses not to
hire any additional workers.
This same line of reasoning is applicable to “Shoot-Down” laws.
While these laws intend to improve society by making narco-traffickers stop transporting drugs, chances are narco-traffickers will
adapt rather than stop. And the means through which they decide to
adapt may be worse for society as a whole than the status quo.
Take for example the usually undiscussed reality of non-state
armed groups in the Andes region. In Peru, remnants of the Maoist
Shining Path terrorist organization continue to operate in the coca
producing valleys of the central Andes.70 In Colombia, both FARC
terrorists and former (and supposedly de-mobilized) paramilitary
forces known as bacrim or bandas criminales also operate in coca
areas.71 Their presence provides narco-traffickers with a wide array
of adaptation tools that defenders of “Shoot-Down” laws seldom
discuss. Indeed, the main incentive “Shoot-Down” laws create for
narco-traffickers is to even out the stakes: if authorities are now authorized to shoot narco-traffic suspects, then they must make sure
that not everyone inside the aircraft is guilty of narco-trafficking. It
is not difficult to see narco-traffickers in the near future working
closer with these other criminal organizations to secure kidnapped
individuals to carry with them in their planes. Authorities would not
be able to shoot down aircraft that contain innocent people inside.
The status quo would continue, only this time, with kidnappings.
Even if one assumes that “Shoot-Down” laws can incentivize
narco-traffickers to abandon air-transportation altogether, however,
it would be a mistake to assume that less planes means less drugs.
70

Shining Path, Tupac Amaru (Peru, leftists), COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC
AFFAIRS (Sept. 28, 2008) http://www.coha.org/shining-path-tupac-amaru-peruleftists/.
71
See generally Bandas Criminales, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, http://web.sta
nford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/607 (last updated Aug.
28, 2015).
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Narco-traffickers will simply need to begin transporting the same
amounts of drug though land, and, in order to do that, they will need
to secure the collaboration of armed groups. This would empower
and enrich such groups to the detriment of the civilian population,
and simultaneously increase the point of sale price of cocaine once
it arrives in the United States, making it a more profitable business.
Instead of curving crime, “Shoot-Down” laws would incentivize
new crimes without doing much to stifle the overall coca trade in the
region.
For these reasons, alternative measures must be explored: specifically, placing greater emphasis on multi-lateral cooperation. The
three most relevant countries—Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru—have
signed various bilateral and multilateral agreements on the fight
against narco-trafficking, all of which require, in one way or another, information sharing.72 Article IV of the Peru-Colombia agreement states: “For the achievement of this agreement’s objectives,
competent services will grant mutual technical-scientific assistance
and shall exchange information on individual and associated producers, processors and smugglers”.73 Article VII sets out an obliga-

72

Convenio entre la República de Colombia y la República de Bolivia sobre
Cooperación para el Control de Tráfico Ilícito de Estupefacientes, Sustancias Sicotrópicas y Delitos Conexos, Prevención del Consumo, Rehabilitación y Desarrollo Alternativo, Colom.-Bol., Mar. 12, 2001, available at http://apw.cancilleria.gov.co/Tratados/adjuntosTratados/BOLIVIA_B-CONVENIOCOOPSU
STANCIASPSICOTROPICAS2001-TEXTO.PDF [hereinafter Convenio entre
Colombia y Bolivia]; Convenio entre la República del Perú y la República de
Bolivia sobre Cooperación en Materia de Desarrollo Alternativo, Prevención del
Consumo, Rehabilitación, Control del Tráfico Ilícito de Estupefacientes y Sustancias Psicotrópicas y sus Delitos Conexos, Bol.-Peru, June 9, 2000, available at
http://www.devida.gob.pe/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Bolivia-Convenio-deCooperaci%C3%B3n-Bilateral.pdf [hereinafter Convenio entre Perú y Bolivia];
Convenio Administrativo entre la República Peruana y la República de Colombia
para el Control, la Prevención y la Represión del Uso y Tráfico Ilícito de Sustancias Estupefacientes y Sicotrópicas, Colom.-Peru, Mar. 30, 1979, available at
http://www.devida.gob.pe/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/1279-Convenio-Administrativo-para-el-Control-la-Prevenci%C3%B3n-y-la-Represi%C3%B3n-delUso-y-Tr%C3%A1fico-Ilicito . . . .pdf [hereinafter Convenio entre Perú y Colombia].
73
Convenio entre Perú y Colombia, supra note 72, at art. IV (translation from
original text in Spanish: “Para el logro de los objetivos del presente Convenio, los
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tion to cooperate whenever undertaking specific operations in frontier areas, and Article XI establishes a Mixed Peru-Colombia Commission in charge of advising both countries on which mechanisms
and policies should be pursued.74
While this is a pattern shared by the Colombia-Bolivia and PeruBolivia agreements as well, not all agreements are as specific with
regards to the issue of aircraft and the specific measures that should
be taken to address the problem. The Colombia-Bolivia agreement,
for example, requires the parties to merely “grant assistance for the
exchange of information related to criminal modus operandi, routes,
identification of individuals, methods to strengthen illicit drug trafficking . . . with the objective of detecting organizations dedicated
to illicit trafficking of drugs and psychotropic substances . . . “75 On
the contrary, the Peru-Bolivia agreement specifically mentions aircraft detection, stating that “the parties shall cooperate with one another to provide information on the routes of ships and aircraft suspicious of being used for illicit drug-trafficking, psychotropic substances and other conducts . . . so that the competent authorities can
adopt the measures they consider necessary.”76
These different approaches to information sharing and bilateral
cooperation as well as the general nature of obligations undertaken
contribute to making aircraft interdiction a primarily domestic endeavor. The aircraft involved in narco-trafficking are short-range

servicios competentes se otorgarán mutua asistencia técnico-científica, e intercambiarán informaciones sobre productores, procesadores y traficantes individuales y asociados.”).
74
Id. at art. VII, art. XI.
75
Convenio entre Colombia y Bolivia, supra note 72, at art. II(3) (translation
from original text in Spanish: “Las Partes se prestarán asistencia para el intercambio de información relacionada con modalidades delictivas, rutas, identidades de
personas, métodos para fortalecer el tráfico ilícito de drogas a que se refiere este
Convenio, con el fin de detectar organizaciones dedicadas al tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes y sustancias sicotrópicas . . . “).
76
Convenio entre Perú y Colombia, supra note 72, at art. II(2) (translation
from original text in Spanish: “Las Partes cooperarán entre sí para brindarse información sobre rutas de naves y aeronaves de las que se sospeche están siendo
utilizadas para el tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas y demás conductas descritas en el numeral 1 artículo 3 de la Convención, a fin de que
las autoridades competentes puedan adoptar las medidas que consideren necesarias.”).
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vehicles that must land at some point. Shared intelligence and sufficient allocated resources would be enough to be sure that an operation can be launched at the landing strip of choice. The problem for
law enforcement is that they either do not have the means to conduct
these sting operations or they have to lose track of the aircraft once
it crosses an international border. Shooting it down is the simple way
out of these problems, but it is also not the legal one.
Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and perhaps even Brazil, therefore,
need to increase multilateral cooperation with regard to radar intelligence and multinational sting operations. Procedures need to be
harmonized and a permanent multilateral law enforcement organization or unit needs to be created to allow for effective cooperation.
This way, when a Peruvian radar detects a suspicious aircraft and
moves to intercept it, it can call upon its Bolivian counterpart to loiter nearby the border and continue pursuing until it lands, where law
enforcement agents can later conduct the arrest. In the same vein,
better radar technology can be used to preventively detect and destroy illegal landing strips used by narco-traffickers.
Latin American governments have created similar task forces for
various important topics in the past. The Permanent Commission for
the South Pacific, which integrates Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador, seeks to coordinate “regional maritime policies in order to
adopt concerted positions of its Member States . . . in international
negotiations, development of the Law of the Sea, International Environmental Law and other multilateral initiatives”.77 Other exam-

77

Regional Fishery Bodies Summary Descriptions: Permanent Commission
for the South Pacific (CPPS), FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORG. OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/cpps/en (last visited Dec. 28, 2016) (explaining that the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific was established
through the Declaration of Santiago in 1952 by the States of Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador and Peru. Its role is to coordinate regional maritime policies in international negotiations, development of the Law of the Sea, International Environmental Law and other multilateral initiatives).
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ples, set up at the United Nations level, include the Economic Commission for Latin America78 and the Latin American and Caribbean
Forestry Commission.79
An inter-governmental regional organization that tackles aerial
drug intervention on a permanent basis would address the issues directly and have a broader impact in the region, as it would be able
to integrate security policies with local development initiatives and
demand suppression strategies.
5.
A FOREWARNED WAR
If a militarized policy of responding to criminal activity with lethal force is continued, however, it will only be a matter of time
before one of these cases reaches international fora; specifically, the
Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS). The IAHRS is
comprised of two bodies, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR), and is one of the most renowned and respected

78

The Economic Commission for Latin America was created by Economic
and Social Council resolution 106(VI) with the purpose of contributing with the
economic development of the region. The Member States of the Commission are:
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
United States, France, Germany, Granada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Italia, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, Republic of Korea,
Dominican Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, San Vicente y las Granadinas, Saint
Lucia, Spain, Suriname, Trinidad y Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. See About
ECLAC, ECONOMIC COMM’N FOR LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN,
http://www.cepal.org/en/about (last visited Dec. 28, 2016).
79
In 1948 the Latin American and Caribbean Forestry Commission was established by FAO to provide a policy and technical forum to discuss forest issues
on a regional basis. The State Members of the Commission are: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, United States, France, Granada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, United Kingdom, Dominican Republic,
Saint Kitts y Nevis, San Vicente y las Granadinas, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad y Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. See Latin American and Caribbean Forestry Commission, FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.fao.org/forestry/31106/en/ (last updated Feb. 27 2015).
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human rights protection systems in the world.80 Its jurisprudence has
been instrumental for the elaboration and development of doctrines
related to forced disappearances as a human rights violation,81 the
responsibility of the state for the actions of non-state armed
groups,82 reparations,83 the illegality of military trials,84 and the unenforceability of blanket amnesty laws.85 Throughout this vast jurisprudence, however, one thing is manifestly clear: use of lethal force
by law enforcement officials must be ultima ratio.
As stated above, the IACHR recognizes the human rights standard of absolute necessity.86 This standard directly contradicts the
policy set out by “Shoot-Down” laws. These laws do not limit the
downing of civilian aircraft to extraordinary circumstances, but rather merely to situations of suspicion of a crime. They also do not
establish an “absolutely necessary” standard, given that by definition it is not absolutely necessary to shoot down an airplane when
one can arrest the crew upon landing.
While there is no precedent that deals with the exact same situation, the case of Armando Alejandre & others v. Cuba can offer
some insights.87. That case deals with the 1996 downing of an Amer-

80

Christina Binder, The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, 12 GER. L. J. 1203, 1203 (2011) (stating that ‘[t]he InterAmerican Court of Human Rights has proven a particularly active defender of
human rights in Latin America’ and that ‘[l]egal scholars have praised the InterAmerican Court for its effective protection of human rights’) (footnote omitted).
81
Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 7, ¶ 7 (July 21, 1989), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec
_07_ing.pdf (citing paragraph 2 of the Resolution of Jan. 20, 1989).
82
Id.
83
See generally Thomas Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights
Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 351 (2008), available at http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.ed
u/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1313&context=faculty.
84
Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 52, ¶ 132 (May 30, 1999), http://www.corteidh
.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_52_ing.pdf.
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Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C.) No.
75, ¶ 1 (Mar. 14, 2001), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_
75_ing.pdf.
86
Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador, supra note 51, at ¶ 84.
87
See Armando Alejandre Jr., Carlos Costa, Mario de la Peña, and Pablo Morales v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Report No. 86/99,
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ican civilian aircraft looking for Cuban rafters in international waters by the Cuban air force.88 Without any justification and without
warning, the Cuban air force simply scrambled Mig-29 fighter jets
and opened fire, killing all the occupants.89
The IACHR stated in its report on the merits that “[these] actions
were a clear violation of established international rules, which require all measures to be exhausted before resorting to aggression
against any airplanes and utterly forbid the use of force against civilian aircraft.”90
In any case, “Shoot-Down” laws seem to be gaining increasing
levels of attention.91 It is therefore unlikely that the IAHRS would
consider them legal in any way, and, in all likelihood, a government
accused of shooting down a civilian airplane would decidedly lose
its case.
This is important because, as of late, the IAHRS has been under
much pressure from unsatisfied governments that complain the system is biased against them and that it is impossible for them to receive a fair trial. In 2012, for example, Venezuela denounced the
Pact of San José, the agreement granting jurisdiction to the IACHR,
accusing the Court of being “held captive by a small group of callous
bureaucrats who have blocked, hampered, and prevented necessary
changes.”92 Ecuador’s President, Rafael Correa, has in turn com-

OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106 doc.3 (1999), https://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99eng/M
erits/Cuba11.589.htm.
88
Id. at ¶ 1
89
Id.
90
Id. at ¶ 8.
91
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, supra note 54, at ¶ 31-32
(arguing that “While many States have reformed their laws during the last few
decades to give greater expression to the international rules and standards . . . in
some cases, progress that has been made is under threat . . . There is a danger that
laws such as the one recently adopted by Honduras entitling the State to shoot
down civilian airplanes may be used to violate the right to live, for example in the
name of drug control.”).
92
Nicolás Maduro Moros, Letter to José Miguel Insulza of the Organization
of American States (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.oas.org/dil/nota_república_boliv
ariana_venezuela_to_sg.english_part_1.pdf.
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plained about alleged bias at the heart of the Inter-American System,93 while Brazil got in a spat with the Commission when it ordered a halt in the construction of the multi-million dollar Belo
Monte Dam project.94
All of these problems have led several states to promote profound reform proposals that in some instances threaten to weaken
the independence of the system.95 They have also withheld contributions to the system96 to the point of risking its bankruptcy and
massive layoffs.97
The aforementioned analysis with regards to “Shoot-Down”
laws can give context to these heated accusations. After all, in many
instances, the alleged bias revolves around cases where governments specifically went against clear-cut prohibitions in international human rights law or in the long-held jurisprudence of the
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Agencia de Noticias Públicas del Ecuador (Andes), Rafael Correa Cuestiona la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, AMÉRICA ECONOMÍA
(Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.americaeconomia.com/politica-sociedad/politica/rafael-correa-cuestiona-la-comision-interamericana-de-derechos-humanos.
94
Mari Huayman, Brazil Breaks Relations With Human Rights Commission
Over Belo Monte Dam, LATIN AMERICA NEWS DISPATCH (May 3, 2011), http:/
/latindispatch.com/2011/05/03/brazil-breaks-relations-with-human-rights-commission-over-belo-monte-dam/.
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Ecuador Will Insist on a Comprehensive Reform to the Inter-American Human Rights System During the 46th OAS Assembly, ANDES (Oct. 6, 2016),
http://www.andes.info.ec/en/news/ecuador-will-insist-comprehensive-reform-inter-american-human-rights-system-during-46th-oas.
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Daniel Cerqueira, Brazil, Ecuador, and the Inter-American Human Rights
System, AMERICAS QUARTERLY (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.americasquarterly.
org/content/brazil-ecuador-and-inter-american-human-rights-system.
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Press Release, Severe Financial Crisis of the IACHR Leads to Suspension
of Hearings and Imminent Layoff of Nearly Half its Staff, ORG. OF AMERICAN
STATES (May 23, 2016), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/201
6/069.asp.
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Court. None of these cases, not Ecuador’s lack of respect for freedom of expression,98 nor Venezuela’s disregard for political dissent,99 nor Brazil’s negligence with indigenous rights was an unpredictable or extraordinary result. These cases were more the result of
governments ignoring existing law, rather than an overreaching
Court.
The same problem is beginning to arise with “Shoot-Down”
laws. South American governments are designing a legal regime
manifestly incompatible with Inter-American case law. These laws
are destined to be deemed unlawful at the IAHRS, yet these states
insist on pursuing them. When the time comes, once the cases are
lost and the laws are annulled by the IACtHR, they will accuse it of
bias. This is, for all intents and purposes, a forewarned war, and
“guerra avisada, no mata gente.”
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20, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/07/20/ecuador.libel.law
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Catalina Lobo-Guerrero, La Policía de Maduro Detiene al Alcalde Opositor de Caracas, EL PAÍS (Feb. 20, 2015), http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2015/02/20/actualidad/1424386802_955983.html.

